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167在西方企业治理实践中，董事长薪酬普遍低于总经理薪酬，而中国民营企业则呈现截然相反的薪酬结构特征。文章基于中国独特的人格化交易背景，从理论层面揭示了这一现象的内在逻辑：民营企业大股东通常持有并维系重要的专有性资产，这使其能够将董事长薪酬作为管理层薪酬的约束与激励工具。文章实证研究发现，在中国民营企业中，董事长薪酬发挥显著的约束功能，体现为董事长薪酬水平显著高于管理层薪酬；同时，董事长薪酬具有激励功能，体现为管理层薪酬业绩敏感性显著高于董事长薪酬业绩敏感性。在机制检验方面，文章从大股东专有性资产的形成过程、具体内容与表现形式、持有形式以及稳定性四个维度，系统衡量了大股东专有性资产的重要程度，研究结果均支持了大股东专有性资产对这一约束与激励工具的重要影响。进一步研究表明，采用这类“紧箍咒”式薪酬工具既产生了降低管理层薪酬增速、减少第一类代理成本和提高管理效率等正面经济后果，也带来了较难吸引高质量管理人才和阻碍企业转型创新等负面经济影响。文章的研究深化了对中国民营企业薪酬结构的理论认知，为优化企业治理机制和提升治理效能提供了重要的政策启示，对于推动中国特色现代企业制度建设具有重要的现实意义。
民营企业董事长薪酬是管理层的“紧箍咒”吗？——基于大股东专有性资产的解释
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曹哲涵, 刘浩. 民营企业董事长薪酬是管理层的“紧箍咒”吗？——基于大股东专有性资产的解释[J]. 财经研究, 2024, 50(12): 152-166.
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