2987 
2588如何配置家族高管与非家族高管的结构性权力以保证经营决策的科学性，对于家族企业的长期发展来说至关重要。本文以2012—2019年中国沪深两市A股上市家族企业为研究样本，考察高管结构性权力配置对家族企业长期投资的影响。研究发现：（1）“厚此薄彼”的高管结构性权力配置并不能显著促进家族企业的长期投资，具体表现为“厚”家族高管“薄”非家族高管的高管结构性权力配置对家族企业长期投资的影响并不显著，“厚”非家族高管“薄”家族高管的高管结构性权力配置则会显著抑制家族企业长期投资；（2）对家族高管与非家族高管“一视同仁”的高管结构性权力配置会显著促进家族企业的长期投资。进一步的研究表明，高管结构性权力的均衡配置对家族企业长期投资的促进效应主要是通过促进高管长期目标导向、提升高管团队异质性水平而实现的。而且，当家族企业处于成长期、成熟期或者其所面临的市场竞争程度较高时，高管结构性权力的均衡配置对家族企业长期投资的促进作用更强。本文为优化家族企业内部治理、改善家族企业的长期投资水平、促进家族企业“基业长青”等提供了经验证据和管理启示。
厚此薄彼还是一视同仁？——高管结构性权力配置与家族企业长期投资
摘要
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严若森, 赵亚莉. 厚此薄彼还是一视同仁？——高管结构性权力配置与家族企业长期投资[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2022, 44(10): 54-69.
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