总经理更换与高管团队的稳定性研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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财经研究 2006 年 第 32 卷第 01 期, 页码：123 - 134
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章从业绩相关理论、锦标赛理论和专用化人力资本理论出发,对总经理更换后的高管团队稳定性进行了理论分析和实证检验。经验证据表明,总经理更换提高了高管离职的概率,但降低了企业绩效对高管离职的影响;总经理被迫离职后的年轻高管有较高的离职概率;高管与离任总经理的专用化人力资本越高,总经理更换后高管离职概率越高,而与继任总经理的专用化人力资本则可使高管离职概率有一定程度的降低。实证结果支持锦标赛理论和专用化人力资本理论,但业绩相关理论没有得到支持。
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[3]Callahan W T,Millar J A,Schulman C.An analysis of the effect of management partici-pation in director selection on the long-term performance of the firm[J].Journal of Cor-porate Finance,2003,9(2):169~181.
[4]Fee C E,Hadlock C J.Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy[J].Journalof Accounting and Economics,2004,37(1):3~38.
[5]Graziano C,Luporini A.Board efficiency and internal corporate control mechanisms[J].Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,2003,12(4):495~530.
[6]Hermalin B E,Weisbach M S.Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their moni-toring of the CEO[J].American Economic Review,1998,88(1):96~118.
[7]Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs andownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,30(3):305~360.
[8]Jovanovich B.Firm specific capital and turnover[J].Journal of Political Economy,1979,87(6):1246~1260.
[9]Rosen S.Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments[J].American Economic Re-view,1986,76:701~715.
[10]Shen W.Cannella A A.Power dynamics within top management and their impacts onCEO dismissal followed by inside succession[J].Academy of Management Journal,2002,45(6):1195~1206.
[11]Virany B,Tushman M,Romanelli E.Executive succession and organization outcomes inturbulent environments:An organizational leaning approach[J].Organization Science,1992,3:72~90.
引用本文
张必武, 石金涛. 总经理更换与高管团队的稳定性研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2006, 32(1): 123–134.
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