7609 
6797随着资本市场收购热潮的兴起，我国敌意收购事件越来越多。作为控制权市场的监督机制，敌意收购能够有效监督管理者的行为，然而管理者基于管理“壕沟效应”，倾向于使用不同的反收购策略以保障其职位的稳定性。本文全面回顾了国内外有关反收购策略的研究进展，首先，从委托代理理论、管家理论以及基于资产专用性理论的控制权分配机制分别解释管理者采用反收购策略的动因；其次，从管理者相对权力和制度环境的视角分析了影响管理者采用反收购策略的情境因素；最后，综述了主要反收购策略以及不同反收购策略的经济后果，包括对市场反应、收购结果、管理者行为以及目标公司财务绩效的影响，发现相关研究结论是不一致的。本文认为，未来需要对反收购策略使用的动机、情境条件和经济后果做进一步研究。
管理者反收购策略研究评述和展望
摘要
参考文献
4 Adams R, Ferreira D. One share-one vote: The empirical evidence[J]. Review of Finance, 2008, 12（1）: 51–91.
5 Aghion P, Tirole J. Formal and real authority in organizations[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105（1）: 1–29. DOI:10.1086/262063
6 Bates T W, Becher D A, Lemmon M L. Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 87（3）: 656–677. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.007
7 Bebchuk L A, Coates J C, Subramanian G. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: Theory, evidence, and policy[J]. Stanford Law Review, 2002, 54（5）: 887–951. DOI:10.2307/1229689
8 Bebchuk L A, Cohen A. The costs of entrenched boards[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 78（2）: 409–433. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.006
9 Bebchuk L A, Kraakman R, Triantis G G. Stock Pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity[M]. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000.
10 Berger P G, Ofek E, Yermack D L. Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions[J]. Journal of Finance, 1997, 52（4）: 1411–1438. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01115.x
11 Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 111（5）: 1043–1075. DOI:10.1086/376950
12 Cai W. Hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China[J]. Hong Kong Law Journal, 2012, 42（3）: 901–938.
13 Chang Y K, Chou R K, Huang T H. Corporate governance and the dynamics of capital structure: New evidence[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 48: 374–385.
14 Chintrakarn P, Jiraporn N, Jiraporn P. The effect of entrenched boards on corporate risk-taking: Testing the quiet life hypothesis[J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2013, 20（11）: 1067–1070. DOI:10.1080/13504851.2013.783677
15 Daines R. Does Delaware law improve firm value?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 62（3）: 525–558.
16 Danielson M G, Karpoff J M. Do pills poison operating performance?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006, 12（3）: 536–559. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.10.001
17 Field L C, Karpoff J M. Takeover defenses of IPO firms[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2002, 57（5）: 1857–1889. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00482
18 Giroud X, Mueller H M. Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity prices[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2011, 66（2）: 563–600. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01642.x
19 Goktan M S, Kieschnick R. A target’s perspective on the effects of ATPs in takeovers after recognizing its choice in the process[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2012, 18（5）: 1088–1103. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.07.003
20 Gompers P A, Ishii J, Metrick A. Corporate governance and equity prices[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003, 118（1）: 107–156. DOI:10.1162/00335530360535162
21 Guo R J, Kruse T, Nohel T. Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of staggered boards[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008, 14（3）: 274–288. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.03.007
22 Henry D. Directors’ recommendations in takeovers: An agency and governance analysis[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2005, 32（1-2）: 129–159.
23 Heron R A, Lie E. The effect of poison pill adoptions and court rulings on firm entrenchment[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, 35: 286–296. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.09.008
24 Holmén M, Nivorozhkin E, Rana R. Do anti-takeover devices affect the takeover likelihood or the takeover premium?[J]. The European Journal of Finance, 2014, 20（4）: 319–340. DOI:10.1080/1351847X.2012.703141
25 Jenkinson T, Ljungqvist A. The role of hostile stakes in German corporate governance[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2001, 7（4）: 397–446. DOI:10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00034-7
26 Johnson W C, Karpoff J M, Yi S. The bonding hypothesis of takeover defenses: Evidence from IPO firm[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015, 117（2）: 307–332. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.03.008
27 La Porta R, Vishny R W. Law and finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106（6）: 1113–1155. DOI:10.1086/250042
28 Maclean S, Breweries L. Canadian Firms and Poison Pill Adoption: The Effects on Financial Performance[J]. Journal of Business & Economics Studies, 2006, 12（1）: 40–54.
29 Martín D J S, Díaz I A, Díaz N L D. Ultimate ownership and takeover defences in Spain[J]. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting, 2009, 38（143）: 399–421.
30 Pagano M, Volpin P F. Managers, workers, and corporate control[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005, 60（2）: 841–868. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x
31 Rauh J D. Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 81（2）: 379–410. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.07.004
32 Ruiz-Mallorquí M V, Santana-Martín D J. Ultimate institutional owner and takeover defenses in the controlling versus minority shareholders context[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17（2）: 238–254. DOI:10.1111/corg.2009.17.issue-2
33 Ryngaert M. The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20: 377–417. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(88)90051-7
34 Ryngaert M, Scholten R. Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2010, 16（1）: 16–37. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.09.002
35 Schauten M B J, Van Dijk D, Van Der Waal J P. Corporate governance and the value of excess cash holdings of large European firms[J]. European Financial Management, 2013, 19（5）: 991–1016.
36 Sokolyk T. The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17（3）: 612–627. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.10.005
37 Souther M E. The effects of takeover defenses: Evidence from closed-end funds[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016, 119（2）: 420–440. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.005
38 Straska M, Waller H G. Antitakeover provisions and shareholder wealth: A survey of the literature[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2014, 49（4）: 933–956. DOI:10.1017/S0022109014000532
引用本文
顾慧莹, 王小妹, 姚铮. 管理者反收购策略研究评述和展望[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2017, 39(5): 115–128.
导出参考文献，格式为：
