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3409在传统公司治理环境中，普遍存在的多个大股东所有权现象，是上市公司重要的监督制衡结构。本文在家族企业多个大股东之间存在典型裙带关系的特定情境下，从审计定价视角考察监督或制衡机制是否有效。基于2007—2017年沪深A股家族上市公司数据，本文对家族企业中多个大股东的互动如何影响审计定价展开研究，发现拥有多个大股东的家族企业审计收费显著更高。进一步研究发现，家族企业多个大股东与审计收费之间的显著正相关关系主要存在于控股股东发生股权质押时以及市场化程度低的地区，并且在市场化程度低的地区，股权质押会显著增强多个大股东对审计费用的提升作用。机制检验表明，盈余管理、送转股和股票策略性改名三种市值管理手段，是多个大股东影响审计定价的具体路径。研究结果从审计定价角度揭示了家族企业多个大股东的合谋动机，为多个大股东经济后果的文献提供了新“拼图”，也为理解资本市场侵占中小股东利益事件中的审计失职现象提供了经验证据。
多个大股东与审计定价——基于中国家族企业的研究
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
牛瑞阳, 陈琳, 李瑞涛, 等. 多个大股东与审计定价——基于中国家族企业的研究[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2021, 43(6): 57-73.
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