担保机构与中小企业贷款：银行视角下的合谋还是合作？
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财经研究 2015 年 第 41 卷第 07 期, 页码：
摘要
参考文献
摘要
中小企业融资难是长期存在的难题，融资性担保机构的设立对缓解这一难题起到了一定的积极作用。文章从银行视角出发，对担保机构在中小企业贷款中发挥的作用进行了理论和实证分析，得到以下结论：一方面，银行认为国有政策性担保机构与企业的合谋概率较高，对其在担保合同中发出的企业类型信号并不信任（如担保费率等），因而在制定利率时主要依靠自身对企业风险的判断；另一方面，银行认为民营商业性担保机构与企业的合谋概率较低，对其发出的担保信号较为信任，在利率定价时会重点关注其提供的信息。
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[3]龙硕，胡军．政企合谋视角下的环境污染：理论与实证研究[J]．财经研究，2014，（10）：131－144．
[4]马松，潘珊，姚长辉．担保机构、信贷市场结构与中小企业融资：基于信息不对称框架的理论分析[J]．经济科学，2014，（5）：62－78．
[5]杨大楷，韩其成．民营企业商业信贷配给与相应信用担保体系完善[J]．财政研究，2003，（7）：60－62．
[6]杨胜刚，胡海波．不对称信息下的中小企业信用担保问题研究[J]．金融研究，2006，（1）：118－126．
[7]姚耀军，董钢锋．中小银行发展与中小企业融资约束：新结构经济学最优金融结构理论视角下的经验研究[J]．财经研究，2014，（1）：105－115．
[8]Altman E I.Financial ratio，discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy［J］. Journal of Finance,1968,23(4):589-609.
[9]Beck, T, DemirgucKunt A. A small and mediumsize enterprises: Access to finance as a growth constraint[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2006, 30(11): 2931-2943.
[10]Berger A N, Udell G F. Relationship lending and lines of credit in small firm finance[J]. Journal of Business, 1995, 68（3）: 351-381.
[11]Berger A N, Udell G F. The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debts markets in the financial growth cycle[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1998, 22（6-8）: 613-673.
[12]Berger A N, Udell G F. Small business credit availability and relationship lending: The importance of bank organizational structure[J]. Economic Journal, 2002, 112(477): 32-54.
[13]Berger A N, Udell G F. A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance[R]. Working Paper, World Bank, 2006.
[14]Emilia B, Giorgio G. Winners or losers? The effects of banking consolidation on corporate borrowers[J]. Journal of Finance, 2007, 62(2): 669-695.
[15]FaureGrinaud A, Laffont J J, Martinort D. Collusion, delegation and supervision with soft information[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2003, 70(2): 253-279.
[16]Gonas J, Highfield M, Mullineaux D. When are commercial loans secured?[J]. Financial Review, 2004, 39（1）: 79-99.
[17]Hanedar E Y,Broccardo E,Bazzana F. Collateral requirements of SMEs: The evidence from lessdeveloped countries[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2014, 38: 106-121.
[18]Laffont J J, Martimort D. Collusion and delegation[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1998, 29（2）: 280-350.
[19]Laffont J J, Martimort D. Mechanism design with collusion and correlation[J]. Econometrica, 2000, 68(2): 309-342.
[20]Meyer R L, Nagarajan G. Credit guarantee scheme for developing countries: Theory, design and evaluation[R]. Report for USAID, 1996.
[21]Stiglitz J E. Incentives, risk, and information: Notes towards a theory of hierarchy[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1975, 6(2): 552-579.
[22]Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information[J]. American Economic Review, 1981, 71(3): 393-410.
[23]Tirole J. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: On the role of collusion in organizations[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 1986, 2(2): 181-214.
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马 松, 潘珊, 姚长辉. 担保机构与中小企业贷款：银行视角下的合谋还是合作？[J]. 财经研究, 2015, 41(7): 0.
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