346 
290虽然监管问询制度的初衷在于发挥治理作用，维护资本市场稳定，但它也会向市场传递企业存在潜在风险的信号，进而对企业产生不利影响。这是否会扭曲企业行为，最终违背监管初衷呢？文章从杠杆操纵视角，以我国2013—2021年A股非金融上市公司为研究样本，发现财报问询函会加剧企业的杠杆操纵行为。机制分析表明，财报问询函引发了债权人风险感知，进而迫使企业通过杠杆操纵来维持企业投融资需求。文章还从企业特征和问询函特征两个方面进行了补充验证。在企业特征方面，该效应在事前风险较高、信息环境较差以及投融资需求较高的样本中更显著；在问询函特征方面，该效应在问询程度较高、问询内容涉及债权人风险时更显著。拓展性分析表明，无论是中期报告问询函还是年度报告问询函，均会对企业杠杆操纵产生影响；而相对于财报问询函，一般问询函并不会对杠杆操纵产生影响。此外，内部控制有效性可以削弱财报问询函对杠杆操纵的影响。文章的结论不仅补充了财报问询函和杠杆操纵的相关研究，还有助于进一步优化和规范我国监管问询制度，对防范企业隐性债务风险以及推动我国资本市场发展具有重要意义。
监管问询函、债权人风险感知与企业杠杆操纵
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王晓佳, 毛新述, 于芙. 监管问询函、债权人风险感知与企业杠杆操纵[J]. 财经研究, 2024, 50(10): 124-138.
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