风险投资中控制权分配及其影响因素的研究
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 12 期, 页码：109 - 117
摘要
参考文献
摘要
在风险投资中,创业者和风险投资家由于目标不同而存在着利益冲突,这时对风险企业的控制权进行适当分配成为关键。由于风险投资中有关控制权问题的复杂性,国内外对这方面的研究目前还较少,尚处于起步阶段。文章以不完全合同作为理论基础通过建立两期模型分析了影响风险企业中控制权配置的重要因素,从而在统一的不完全合同理论的框架下对风险企业的控制权、现金流量权、声誉机制等各种影响因素展开系统的研究。
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[2]Berglof E.A control theory of venture capital finance[J].Journal of Law,Economicsand Organization,1994.10:247~267.
[3]Chan Y,Siegel D,Thakor A leaning.Corporate control and performance requirementsin venture capital contracts[J].International Economic Review,1990,31:393~414.
[4]Dewatripont M,J Tirole.A theory of debt and equity:Diversity of securities and man-ager shareholder congruence[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109:1027~1054.
[5]Grossman S,O Hart.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lat-eral integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:691~719.
[6]Hart O,J Moore.Property rights and the nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political E-conomy,1990,98:1119~1158.
[7]Hellmann T.The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts[J].RandJournal of Economics,1998,29(1):57~76.
[8]Kaplan Steven N,Per Stromberg,How do venture capitalists choose investments?[R].Working Paper,Graduate School of Business,University of Chicago,2000.
[9]Kaplan S,Stromberg P.Financial contracting theory meets the real word:An empricialanalysis of the venture capital contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,2002,70:281~316.
[10]Kaplan S,Stromberg P.Characteristics,contracts,and actions:Evidence from ven-ture capitalist analyses[J].The Journal of Finance.2004,(5):2173~2206.
[11]Sahlman W.Structure and governance of venture-capital organizations[J].Journal ofFinancial Economics,1990,27:473~524.
[12]Tirole T.Corporate Governance[J].Econometrica,2001,69(1):1~35.
[13]哈特(费方域译).企业、合同与财务结构[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1998.
[14]安实,王健,何琳.风险企业控制权分配的博弈过程分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2002,(12):81~87.
[15]姚佐文.风险资本家与企业家之间的控制权分配和转移[J].安徽农业大学学报,2004,(5):26~29.
[16]欧阳凌,欧阳令南,周红霞.创业投资企业的控制权配置与非效率投资行为[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005,14(2):104~107.
[17]郝宇,韩文秀.风险企业控制权配置研究[J].天津大学学报2005,7(2):102~105.
引用本文
李金龙, 费方域, 胡海鸥. 风险投资中控制权分配及其影响因素的研究[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(12): 109–117.
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