大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护
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财经研究 2005 年 第 31 卷第 12 期, 页码：97 - 108
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章从负债代理成本的角度,考察了在我国对债权人保护较弱的情况下,控制上市公司的大股东利用资产替代来侵害债权人利益的行为,研究结果表明:(1)我国上市公司大股东进行资产替代的行为与其持股比例之间呈倒“N”型的非线性关系;(2)公司投资机会的增加会对大股东的资产替代行为产生影响;(3)由生产经营性单位控制的上市公司比非生产经营性单位控制的上市公司的资产替代行为更为严重。
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[3]刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择———中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究[A].王立彦.中国会计评论[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2004,141~158.
[4]童盼,陆正飞.负债融资、负债来源与企业投资行为———来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(5):75~84.
[5]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东的所有权、企业业绩与公司治理效力[M].吉林:中国首届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2002:287~300.
[6]Bagnani E,Milonas N,Saunders A,et al.Managers,owners,and the pricing of riskdebt:An empirical analysis[J].Journal of Finance,1994,45:453~477.
[7]Berkovitch E,Kim E.Financial contracting and leverage induced over-and under-invest-ment incentives[J].Journal of Finance,1990,45:765~794.
[8]Berle A,Means G.The modern corporation and private property[M].Macmillan,NewYork,1932.
[9]Bradley M,Jarrell A,Kim H.On the existence of an optimal capital structure[J].Journal of Finance,1984,39:857~878.
[10]Brito J,John K.Leverage and growth opportunities:Risk-avoidance induced by riskydebt[R].Working paper,New York University,2001.
[11]Cho M.Ownership structure,investment,and the corporate value:An empirical anal-ysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1998,47:103~121.
[12]Esty B.Organizational form and risk taking in the savings and loan industry[J].Jour-nal of Financial Economics,1997,44:25~55.
[13]Gavish B,Kalay A.On the asset substitution problem[J].Journal of Financial andQuantitative Analysis,1983,18:21~30.
[14]Inderst R,Müller H M.Ownership concentration,monitoring,and the agency cost ofdebt[R].Working paper,University of Mannheim,1999.
[15]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior,agency costs,andownership structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305~360.
[16]Johnson S,La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silanes F,et al.Tunneling[J].American EconomicReview,2000,90:22~27.
[17]La Porta R,Lopez-de-Silanes F,Shleifer A,et al.Investor protection and corporategovernance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:3~28.
[18]Mao C X.Interaction of debt agency problems and optimal capital structure:Theoryand evidence[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38:399~423.
[19]Morck R,Shleifer A,Vishny R.Management ownership and market valuation:Anempirical analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293~315.
[20]Myers S.Determinants of corporate borrowing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5:147~175.
[21]Parrino R,Weisbach M S.Measuring investing distortions arising from stockholder-bondholder conflicts[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,53:3~42.
[22]Prowse S D.Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in theUnited States and Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,27:43~66.
[23]Shleifer A,Vishny R.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52:737~783.
引用本文
江伟, 沈艺峰. 大股东控制、资产替代与债权人保护[J]. 财经研究, 2005, 31(12): 97–108.
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