4322 
4627文章通过引入国内金融机构和国际金融机构，将国外金融冲击和国内资本流动宏观审慎政策纳入小国开放经济的DSGE框架中，研究了资本流动宏观审慎政策的有效性。研究发现，国外加息冲击会收紧国内金融机构的资产负债表，并经由银行激励约束而减小企业信贷规模；同时，本国货币贬值，国际资本外流，影响金融体系的稳定。我国推动健全资本流动的宏观审慎政策机制，能够有效应对国外加息冲击的影响，保持资本流动的相对稳定，减轻国内企业的融资压力，提高社会福利。
资本流动宏观审慎政策有效性研究——基于包含国内外金融机构的DSGE分析
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引用本文
赵胜民, 张瀚文. 资本流动宏观审慎政策有效性研究——基于包含国内外金融机构的DSGE分析[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(8): 156-169.
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