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5365随着以信息和互联网为代表的知识经济的发展,越来越多的企业运用二元股权结构赋予创始股东控制公司董事会、进而控制公司重大经营与财务决策的权利,以激励企业家创业和创新。本文首先分析了公司选用二元股权结构的动因,包括保护企业家和创始股东控制权、防止恶意收购、防止职业经理人的利益侵害和行业需要等。其次,从企业家才能、法治传统和成本与收益权衡等角度分析了二元股权结构中所有权与控制权安排的机理。再次,综述了公司选择二元股权结构的经济后果,包括对股价、回报率和财务业绩的影响,对盈余质量和信息披露质量的影响,相关研究结论是混合的。本文认为,需要加强对二元股权结构的经济学理论基础、适用条件、经济后果和投资者保护机制等问题的研究。
公司二元股权结构研究述评和展望
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
陆宇建. 公司二元股权结构研究述评和展望[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(5): 86–98.
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