不完全契约及关系契约视角下的PPP最优控制权配置探讨
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外国经济与管理 2007 年 第 29 卷第 08 期, 页码：24 - 29
摘要
参考文献
摘要
公私合作(PPP)被认为是通过公共部门和私人部门的合作来提升公共服务水平的重要模式。本文对现有PPP研究进行了回顾和总结,强调了PPP的契约本质,指出合作方性质不同、产品公共化程度较高以及合作期较长是PPP区别于传统的企业间合作模式的三大特点。文章从契约视角出发,指出影响PPP效率的关键是控制权的最优配置,并提出了"从不完全契约及关系契约两个方面研究PPP合作模式中控制权最优配置问题"这一研究PPP合作效率的新思路。
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[6]Klein,B.Transaction cost determinants of'unfair contractual arrangements[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(2):356-362.
[7]Shavell,S.Damage measures for breach of contract[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(Aut.):466-490.
[8]Dye,R.Costly contract contingencies[J].International Economic Review,1985,26:233-250.
[9]Grossman,S,and Hart,O.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Political Economy,1986,94:691-719.
[10]Hart,Oliver,and Moore,John.Property rights and nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(6):1 119-1 158.
[11]Rousseau,D M.New hire perceptions of their own and their employer’s obligations:A study of psychological contracts[J].Journal ofOrganizational Behavior,1990,11:389-400.
[12]Hart,O D.Firm,contracts and financial structure[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1995.
[13]Hart,O,and Moore,J.Default and renegotiation:A dynamic model of debt[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113:1-41.
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[16]Besley,Timothy,and Ghatak,M.Government versus private ownership of public goods[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,116(4):1 343-1 372.
[17]Francesconi,M,and Muthoo,A.Control rights in public-private partnerships[R].IZA Discussion Paper 2143,2006.
[18]Brito,Dagobert L,and Oakland,W H.On the monopolistic provision of excludable public goods[J].American Economic Review,1980,70(4):691-704.
[19]Barro,Robert J,and Sala-I-Martin,X.Public finance in models of economic growth[J].Review of Economic Studies,1992,59(4):645-661.
[20]Michael D Ryall,and Rachelle C Sampson.Do prior alliances influence contract structure?Evidence from technology alliance contracts[R].Working Paper No.FR 03-11,Simon School of Business,University of Rochester,2003.
引用本文
张喆, 贾明, 万迪昉. 不完全契约及关系契约视角下的PPP最优控制权配置探讨[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2007, 29(8): 24–29.
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