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7695本文为理解公司股权集中及第二类代理问题的前因后果提供了较完整的视角,分别对集中型股权结构的普遍性及成因、第二类代理问题的影响进行了归纳,提炼出关于其实证影响的两类模型。本文发现,股权集中及第二类代理问题处于一个同时以控制权收益为起点和终点的因果循环系统中。在此基础上,本文认为对系统外生影响因素的更广泛考察、对资本市场自动监督与约束机制的引入以及对内生性问题的妥善处理可能是将来研究需要关注的重要方面。
股权集中与第二类代理问题研究述评
摘要
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引用本文
吴世飞. 股权集中与第二类代理问题研究述评[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2016, 38(1): 87–100.
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