不完全合同、退出的激励平衡和控制权转移
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财经研究 2006 年 第 32 卷第 07 期, 页码：135 - 144
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章针对创业资本退出时控制权转移问题,构建了基于不完全合同理论的分析框架。首先,文章在合同完全和不完全两种情况下分析了创业投资中的相机控制,得出这种制度安排的根源在于投资双方的激励不平衡的结论;其次,文章分五种情况具体探讨了控制权如何进行转移。
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[6]Grossman S,O Hart.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and later-al integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,(94):691~719.
[7]Hart O,J Moore.Property rights and the nature of the firm[J].Journal of Political E-conomy,1990,(98):1119~1158.
[8]Hellmann T.IPOs,acquisitions and the use of convertible securities in venture capital[R].working paper,2004,University of British Columbia.
[9]Kaplan S,Stromberg P.Characteristics,contracts,and actions:Evidence from venturecapitalist analyses[J].The Journal of Finance,2004,(5):2173~2206.
[10]Lerner J.Venture capitalists and the decision to go public[J].Journal of Financial Eco-nomics,1994,(35):293~231.
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[12]Sahlman W.Structure and governance of venture-capital organizations[J].Journal ofFinancial Economics,1990,27:473~524.
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[14]谈毅.我国风险投资基金管理模式探析[J].科研管理2005,(7):109~116.
[15]李金龙,费方域,胡海鸥.风险投资中控制权影响因素的研究[J].财经研究,2005,(12):107~115.
[16]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.创业资本的分阶段投资激励和控制权分配[J].山西财经大学学报,2006,(1):90~96.
引用本文
李金龙, 费方域, 谈毅. 不完全合同、退出的激励平衡和控制权转移[J]. 财经研究, 2006, 32(7): 135–144.
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