地方官员一定偏好FDI吗?——来自我国283个市级地区面板数据的经验证据
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财经研究 2011 年 第 37 卷第 08 期, 页码：17 - 26
摘要
参考文献
摘要
文章基于2005-2008年市长(书记)交流样本构造了市长(书记)与市区相匹配的面板数据,采用倍差法系统地实证分析了市长(书记)交流对流入地FDI增长的影响。结果发现,官员交流效应因空间和官员职务而异,东部沿海地区的官员交流对FDI流入呈现不显著的正向作用,而内陆地区的市长交流则显著阻碍了FDI流入。进一步考察发现,内陆地区的市长交流效应是通过对非市辖区地区的影响实现的。
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[4]王贤彬,徐现祥.地方官员来源、去向、任期与经济增长——来自中国省长省委书记的证据[J].管理世界,2008,(3):16-26.
[5]王贤彬,徐现祥,李郇.地方官员更替与经济增长[J].经济学(季刊),2009,(4):1301-1328.
[6]徐现祥,王贤彬.晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据[J].世界经济,2010,(2):15-36.
[7]邵敏,黄玖立.外资与我国劳动收入份额——基于工业行业的经验研究[J].经济学(季刊),2010,(4):1189-1210.社会科学战线,2010,(11):35-43.
[9]王文剑,仉建涛,覃成林.财政分权、地方政府竞争与FDI的增长效应[J].管理世界,2007,(3):13-22.
[10]Aitken,Harrison.Do domestic firms benefit from direct foreign investment?Evidence from Venezuela[J].American Economic Review,1999,89:605-618.
[11]Bertrand M,Schoar A.Managing with style:The effect of managers on firm policies[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118:1169-1208.
[12]Zhuravskaya E.Incentives to provide local public goods:Fiscal federalism,Russian style[J].Journal of Public Economics,2000,76:337-368.
[13]Bardhan P.Awakening giants,feet of clay:A comparative assessment of the rise of China and India[J].Journal of South Asian development,2006,1:1-17.
[14]Jones B,Olken B.Do leaders matter?National leadership and growth since World War II[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,2005,120:835-864.
[15]Opper S,Brehm S.Networks versus performance:Political leadership promotion in China[R].Working Paper,Lund University,2007.
[16]Meyer B.Natural and quasi-experiments in economics[J].Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,1995,13:151-161.
引用本文
李飞跃, 王轩. 地方官员一定偏好FDI吗?——来自我国283个市级地区面板数据的经验证据[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 37(8): 17–26.
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