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6180文章基于交易费用和制度变迁理论，利用“八项规定六项禁令”公布这一外生事件，从公司微观层面深入研究寻租行为对公司价值的影响，并进一步讨论在中国新兴市场中寻租行为和公司价值之间的关系如何受到不同产权性质和管制行为的影响。文章实证发现，当“八项规定六项禁令”公布后，市场整体存在显著正的收益。企业“八项规定六项禁令”公布之前的寻租活动越多，“八项规定六项禁令”对公司的增值作用越显著。进一步考察发现，民营企业的价值增加更显著，而国有企业不显著；管制行业公司的价值增加更显著，而非管制行业公司不明显。研究结果表明，寻租行为损害了公司的价值，特别是民营企业和管制行业公司的价值。制度变革能够减少寻租活动，降低交易费用，提高公司价值，进而提高经济的发展水平。文章对我国进一步深化改革，认识制度的作用及其变迁具有重要的指导意义。
寻租、制度变革与公司价值——基于“八项规定六项禁令”的实证检验
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
颜恩点. 寻租、制度变革与公司价值——基于“八项规定六项禁令”的实证检验[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2016, 18(5): 66–78.
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