Based on trading fees and institutional change theory, this paper uses the publication of "Eight Rules and Six Bans" as an exogenous event and deeply examines the effect of rent-seeking behavior on corporate value at corporate micro level. Then it further discusses the effects of property rights and regulation behavior on the relationship between rent-seeking behavior and corporate value in China as an emerging market. It empirically finds that after the announcement of "Eight Rules and Six Bans", there are significantly positive returns in the market as a whole. In addition, more rent-seeking behavior before the announcement of "Eight Rules and Six Bans" leads to the more significant role of "Eight Rules and Six Bans" in the increase in corporate value. Further analysis shows that the increase in corporate value in private companies is more significant, and the one in state-owned companies is not significant; the increase in corporate value in regulated industries is more significant and the one in non-regulated industries is not obvious. It indicates that rent-seeking behavior harms corporate value, especially in private companies and companies in regulated industries. Institution reform can help to reduce rent seeking and trading fees, and improve corporate value and thereby economic development. It is of great guidance significance to further deepening the reform and the understanding of the role of institutions and their changes.