4138 
4739在强调经济高质量发展的时代背景下，作为推动创新驱动发展战略实施的“排头兵”，国有企业被赋予了更多的责任与使命。文章基于双重差分模型考察了容错纠错机制对国有企业创新活动的影响及其背后的作用机理。计量结果显示，容错纠错机制的实施显著提升了国有企业的研发投入，经过一系列的稳健性测试后，该结论依然成立。机制检验证实，容错纠错机制通过提升风险承担和完善公司治理进而促进了国有企业的研发投入。异质性分析表明，股权激励和晋升激励有助于强化容错纠错机制对国有企业的创新激励效应，而货币薪酬激励则没有显著影响。进一步研究发现，容错纠错机制的实施不仅增加了国有企业的创新产出数量，而且还提升了其创新产出质量。这一方面表现为发明专利和实用新型专利显著增加，而外观设计专利没有明显变化；另一方面表现为创新产出的价值增值能力显著提升。上述结论表明，实施容错纠错机制，提高对创新失败的容忍度，同时辅以股权激励和晋升激励机制有助于提升国有企业的创新水平，进而助力经济高质量发展。
容错纠错机制何以激励国企创新？
摘要
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引用本文
叶永卫, 云锋, 曾林. 容错纠错机制何以激励国企创新？[J]. 财经研究, 2022, 48(5): 95-109.
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