3695 
4179合作与协调是人类社会的基本问题。经典理论预测，作为动机复杂且各不相同的行为主体，人与人之间围绕共同的事或物而发生的集体行动往往会落入“个体理性导致集体非理性”的困境。文章基于对中国转型社会一个城中村的长期观察发现，异质性程度大的群体也可以实现自我合作治理。为了弥合现有理论与经验证据的鸿沟，文章基于兰彻斯特法则拓展了现有的个体行为博弈模型和案例分析，找到了解决异质性群体集体行动困境的关键变量−内生的监督和惩罚。相较于政府或市场干预，自我治理组织的制度性建构及其运作，有助于产生符合大部分个体预期的内生监督和惩罚，更有效地维持公共事务自我治理的集体行动。
如何通过内生惩罚解决异质性群体的集体行动困境？——博弈模型与案例分析
摘要
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引用本文
章平, 刘启超. 如何通过内生惩罚解决异质性群体的集体行动困境？——博弈模型与案例分析[J]. 财经研究, 2020, 46(5): 4-16.
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