创业企业控制权配置与创业投资退出问题探讨
外国经济与管理 2009 年 第 31 卷第 02 期, 页码:8 - 14
摘要
参考文献
摘要
本文以创业投资退出时的控制权配置问题为研究对象,首先从创业企业控制权配置的决定因素以及创业企业家和创业投资者双方追求控制权的动机等方面评介了国外的相关研究成果,然后对目前国外关于创业企业控制权配置与创业投资退出的研究进行了简述,最后总结了国外相关研究对我国发展创业投资的启示,并对未来研究进行了展望。
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[3]Hart,O,and Moore,J.Default and renegotiation:Adynamic model of debt[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(1):1-41.
[4]Hell mann,T.The allocation of control rights in venture capital contracts[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1998,29(4):57-76.
[5]Hell mann,T.IPOs,acquisition andthe use of convertible securitiesin venture capital[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,81(3):649-679.
[6]Bascha,A,and U Walz.Convertible securities and opti mal exit decisions in venture capital finance[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2001,7(3):285-306.
[7]Kaplan,S,and P Stromberg.Financial contracting theory meets the real world:An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,2003,70(2):281-315
[8]Gebhardt,G,and Schmidt,K.Conditional allocation of control rights in venture capital finance[EB/OL].http://www.ssrn.com,2006.
[9]Repullo,R,and J Suarez.Venture capital finance:Asecurity design approach[J].Reviewof Finance,2004,8(11):75-108.
[10]Vauhkonen,F.Financial contracts and contingent control rights[EB/OL].http://www.ssrn.com,2003.
[11]Smith,G.Control and exit in venture capital relationships[EB/OL].http://www.ssrn.com,2005.
[12]Casamatta,T.Financing and advising:Opti mal financial contracts with venture capitalists[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(5):2 059-2 085.
[13]Cornelli,F,and O Yosha.Stage financing and the role of convertible debt[J].Reviewof Economic Studies,2003,70(1):1-32.
[14]Hart,O.Financial contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2001,39(4):1 079-1 100.
[15]Lin,T,and Smith,R.Insider reputation and selling decisions:The unwinding of venture capital invest ments during equity IPO[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,1998,4(3):241-263.
引用本文
付雷鸣, 万迪昉, 张雅慧. 创业企业控制权配置与创业投资退出问题探讨[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2009, 31(2): 8–14.
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