2494 
2042“店选网购”能够促进店商和网商之间的竞争，但存在网商搭店商便车的问题；“店网并购”可以缓解搭便车问题，却会限制店商和网商之间的竞争。文章结合“店选网购”和“店网并购”的二重性特征，通过构建具有横向差异化的
“店选网购”与“店网并购”的二重性及社会福利效应*
摘要
参考文献
摘要
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引用本文
徐洪海, 刘婵. “店选网购”与“店网并购”的二重性及社会福利效应*[J]. 财经研究, 2023, 49(4): 139-153.
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