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170平台技术经济特征对传统掠夺性定价理论提出了挑战，平台掠夺性定价的认定值得深入探讨。文章以社区团购平台为例，在分析现实案例特征事实基础上，构建包括低价排他和高价补偿的两阶段横向差异化模型，分析了竞争平台间质量差异、成本差异对掠夺性定价动机和社会福利的影响及其作用机制，探讨了平台掠夺性定价认定规则和反垄断政策。研究结果表明：平台实施掠夺性定价的临界值随着其质量优势的增加而增大，随着其质量劣势的增加而减小；实施掠夺性定价平台的绝对效率和相对效率优势对掠夺性定价动机会产生正向影响；平台掠夺性定价造成的消费者福利损失随着其自身绝对效率的增加而增大，也会随着平台间相对效率绝对值的增加而增大；平台实施掠夺性定价造成的社会总福利损失随着其相对效率劣势的增加而增大，而随着其相对效率优势的增加而减小；当实施掠夺性定价平台具有相对效率劣势且绝对效率较高时，掠夺性定价会造成消费者福利损失和社会总福利损失。文章的研究结论为平台掠夺性定价的认定和反垄断执法提供了参考。
平台掠夺性定价的动机与福利效应*
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于左, 张二鹏. 平台掠夺性定价的动机与福利效应*[J]. 财经研究, 2024, 50(12): 137-151.
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