控股股东、投资者法律保护和公司价值研究综述:基于不对称股权结构视角
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外国经济与管理 2011 年 第 33 卷第 12 期, 页码：42 - 48
摘要
参考文献
摘要
控股股东在各国上市公司中普遍存在,他们利用不对称股权结构在上市公司和自身之间形成多层级的控制链,因而引发了一系列的公司治理问题,进而影响公司价值。基于此,本文以不对称股权结构为主线,梳理了近年来有关控股股东、投资者法律保护和公司价值关系的文献,并对相关实证研究所采用的方法进行了述评,最后对未来研究方向进行了展望,以期为国内相关研究的深入开展提供借鉴。
③有关不对称股权结构决定因素的文献不是本文探讨的重点,我们将简单做一介绍,有兴趣的读者可以参考Smart S B and Zutter C J.Control as a motivation for underpricing:A comparison of dual and single-class IPOs[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,69(1):85-110。
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[12]Lins K V.Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):159-184.
[13]Marianne B and Sendhil M.Enjoying the quiet life?Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[14]McConnell J J and Servaes H.Equity ownership and the two faces of debt[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,9(1):131-157.
[15]Niclas H,et al.Family ownership,dual-class shares,and risk management[J].Global Finance Journal,2006,16(3):283-301.
[16]Shleifer A and Vishny R B.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[17]Villalonga B and Amit R.Benefits and costs of control-enhancing mechanisms in U.S.family firms[R].Working paper,HBS and The Wharton School,2006.
[18]Yermack D.Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns[J].Journal of Financial Econom-ics,2006,80(1):211-242.
[1]Adams R and Ferreira D.One share,one vote:The empirical evidence[J].Review of Finance,2008,12(1):51-91.
[2]Burkart M,et al.Why higher takeover premia protect minority shareholders[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(1):172-204.
[3]Burkart M and Lee S.The one share,one vote debate:A theoretical perspective[R].ECGI-Finance Working Paper No.176,2007.
[4]Burkart M and Panunzi F.Agency conflicts,ownership concentration,and legal shareholder protection[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2006,15(1):1-31.
[5]Claessens S,et al.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.
[6]Easterbrook F H and Fischel D R.The economic structure of corporate law[M].Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1991.
[7]Gompers P A,et al.Extreme governance:An analysis of dual class firms in the United States[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(3):1051-1088.
[8]Holderness C G.The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(4):1377-1408.
[9]Kyle A S.Continuous auctions and insider trading[J].Econometrica,1985,53(6):1315-1335.
[10]La Porta R,et al.Corporate ownership around the world[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[11]La Porta R,et al.Investor protection and corporate valuation[J].Journal of Finance,2002,58(3):1147-1170.
[12]Lins K V.Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):159-184.
[13]Marianne B and Sendhil M.Enjoying the quiet life?Corporate governance and managerial preferences[J].Journal of Political Economy,2003,111(5):1043-1075.
[14]McConnell J J and Servaes H.Equity ownership and the two faces of debt[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,9(1):131-157.
[15]Niclas H,et al.Family ownership,dual-class shares,and risk management[J].Global Finance Journal,2006,16(3):283-301.
[16]Shleifer A and Vishny R B.Large shareholders and corporate control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[17]Villalonga B and Amit R.Benefits and costs of control-enhancing mechanisms in U.S.family firms[R].Working paper,HBS and The Wharton School,2006.
[18]Yermack D.Flights of fancy:Corporate jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns[J].Journal of Financial Econom-ics,2006,80(1):211-242.
引用本文
周方召, 潘鹏杰. 控股股东、投资者法律保护和公司价值研究综述:基于不对称股权结构视角[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2011, 33(12): 42–48.
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