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1080本文探讨了企业内部决策权配置如何影响管理层业绩预告披露中的策略性披露行为。在决策权集中的企业中，高管能够获取更多的控制权私人收益，同时需要为企业业绩承担更大的责任，因此倾向于减少负面业绩预告披露。本文以现金流在母公司的异常集中度作为决策权集中度的度量指标，实证发现该集中度与管理层业绩预告中利空预告的占比呈负相关。机制检验显示，决策权集中度与过度投资、内部人交易和高管薪酬业绩敏感性均呈正相关，说明私人利益增强效应和业绩责任集中效应是两种主要作用机制。异质性分析发现，决策权集中度与利空预告占比的负向关系在子公司数量较多而大股东持股比例较小的企业中更强。进一步分析显示，决策权配置主要影响企业披露利空预告的倾向，而非具体披露数量；对于利空预告，集中决策权会导致披露精度下降和外部归因倾向增强。本文丰富了决策权配置经济后果的相关文献，为优化决策权配置和提高市场信息效率提供了参考。
企业内部决策权配置与业绩预告策略性披露
摘要
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引用本文
潘怡麟, 黄婷婷, 朱凯. 企业内部决策权配置与业绩预告策略性披露[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2026, 48(2): 82-99.
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