政府投资期权监管中最优激励与审核机制构建
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财经研究 2009 年 第 35 卷第 10 期, 页码：60 - 70
摘要
参考文献
摘要
针对投资期权执行中的逆向选择问题,文章提供了一个以最优契约为基础的审核机制。该机制由于加入了内生惩罚约束而更加符合实际。文章重点分析审核机制对投资期权执行效率的影响以及对激励机制的替代作用。这种替代作用表现为投资执行效率方面的完全替代和信息租金方面的部分替代。由于审核机制具有一定的期权特征,致使最优审核机制具有一定的复杂性,因而采用数值模拟的方法进行比较静态分析。最后,以政府实施项目监管和审核机制为背景,提供了一个以股票价格为信号的投资期权审核机制的应用,为政府构建有效的项目投资监管机制提供政策建议。
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[3]梁铄,倪得兵,唐小我.二维不对称信息下的实物期权投资研究[J].中国管理科学,2008,6(3):137-144.
[4]让—雅克.拉丰,大卫.马赫蒂摩.激励理论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002:113-127.
[5]Dixit A K,Pindyck R S.Invest ment under uncertainty[M].Princeton University Press,1994:136-173.
[6]Harris M,C H Kriebel,A Raviv.Asymmetric information,incentives and intrafirmre-source allocation[J].Management Science,1982,28:604-620.
[7]Stulz R M.Managerial discretion and opti mal financing policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26:3-27.
[8]Bernardo A E,HCai,J Luo.Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric in-formation and moral hazard[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2001,61:311-344.
[9]Maeland J.Valuation of irreversible invest ments and agency problem[R].Norwegian School of Economics,Working Paper,2002.
[10]Grenadier S,Wang N.Invest ment ti ming,agency and information[J].Journal of Fi-nancial Economics,2005,75(3):493-533.
[11]Michi Nishihara,Takashi Shibata.The effects of auditing in a real options model[R].Kyoto University,Working Paper,2007.
[12]Gale D,M Hell wig.Repudiation and renegotiation:The case of sovereign debt[J].In-ternational Economic Review,1989,30:3-31.
[13]Khail F.Auditing without commit ment[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1997,28:629-640.
[14]Baron D,D Besanko.Regulation,asymmetric information,and auditing[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1984,15:447-470.
[15]Black F,MScholes.The pricing of options and corporate liabilities[J].Journal of Po-litical Economy,1973:637-654.
[16]R C Merton.On the pricing of corporate debt:The risk structure of interest rates[J].Journal of Finance,1974:449-470.
引用本文
张磊, 赵进文. 政府投资期权监管中最优激励与审核机制构建[J]. 财经研究, 2009, 35(10): 60–70.
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