审计作为国企外部监督体系的重要组成部分,加强国家审计与社会审计的协同,是发挥审计监督作用、提高国企监督效力的必然要求。文章选取2007-2017年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验国家审计监督能否降低国企过度负债以及国家审计与社会审计的协同效应。研究发现,国家审计监督有利于降低国企过度负债;国家审计与社会审计在降低国企过度负债中发挥了协同效应。进一步研究发现,扩大国家审计范围覆盖广度、提高国家审计目标实现深度、加强国家审计权限行使力度以及提高国家审计连续监督频度均有利于降低国企过度负债,其中扩大国家审计监督对象广度的边际贡献最大。文章对有效整合审计资源,提高国家审计与社会审计的协同监督效力,降低国企过度负债具有启示意义。
国家审计监督能降低国企过度负债吗?——基于国家审计与社会审计协同的视角
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引用本文
郭檬楠, 郭金花. 国家审计监督能降低国企过度负债吗?——基于国家审计与社会审计协同的视角[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2020, 22(6): 95-109.
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