8630 
6970欧盟《银行与风险处置条例》赋予成员国强制减记银行债务或债转股的“自救”权力，债权成为自救机制发挥作用的基础。风险处置目标的公共利益属性赋予了“自救”机制处分债权的正当性，但各目标存在冲突且优先次序不明，埋下了债权保障失衡的隐患。“自救”机制虽然“改良”破产清算程序要素，规定了“自救”机制的触发条件、合格债务及其最低标准、债务处置顺序、“不低于破产待遇”及其例外，但存在较大的裁量性。欧盟“自救”机制难以适用于“第三国文件”项下的合格债务，削弱了风险处置的效果，为“第三国”应对“自救”措施提供了空间。我国目前不宜承认和执行欧盟的自救措施，可在全球金融治理层面主张约束“自救”权力的行使，并在今后立法中有限采纳自救机制。
欧盟银行“自救”机制中债权保障的失衡与应对
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参考文献
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引用本文
郭华春. 欧盟银行“自救”机制中债权保障的失衡与应对[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2017, 19(5): 103–115.
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