实验市场中的审计博弈与审计质量——审计师声誉和企业内部监督的比较制度实验研究
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财经研究 2015 年 第 41 卷第 10 期, 页码：
摘要
参考文献
摘要
为考察审计参与人的博弈过程及其结果，文章构建了涉及管理者和审计师等局中人的博弈模型，在此基础上引入审计师声誉机制和内部监督机制，利用比较制度实验经济学的方法对比了两种机制对管理者和审计师行为的影响及其对审计质量的改善效果。研究发现：（1）基准实验中管理者更多地选择较高的舞弊水平，而审计师更多地选择较高的审计力度，实现了福利水平最劣的均衡结果；（2）偏好性的声誉机制对审计质量的改善效果不显著，内部监督机制从根本上减少了舞弊的发生，显著地改善了审计质量；（3）审计力度在内部监督机制与审计质量之间存在完全中介效应。文章对于如何通过治理机制来有效地提高审计质量具有一定的参考价值。
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[2]樊行健, 宋仕杰. 企业内部监督模式研究——基于风险导向和成本效益原则[J]. 会计研究, 2011, (3): 49-53.
[3]方军雄. 转型经济中声誉机制有效性研究——来自中国审计市场的证据[J]. 财经研究, 2011, (12): 16-26.
[4]李晓义, 李建标. 不完备市场的多层次治理——基于比较制度实验的研究[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2009, (4): 1407-1434.
[5]彭桃英, 李良师, 李岚. 审计判断中的时近效应和肯定性倾向——基于持续经营能力判断的实验研究[J]. 会计研究, 2009, (11): 66-72.
[6]王帆, 张龙平. 审计师声誉研究: 述评与展望[J]. 会计研究, 2012, (11): 74-78.
[7]王守海, 杨亚军. 内部审计质量与审计费用研究——基于中国上市公司的证据[J]. 审计研究, 2009, (5): 65-73.
[8]王霞, 王镇蒙. 关于均衡审计市场的研究——对一个无限重复博弈模型的分析[J]. 财经研究, 2005, (2): 88-97.
[9]郁玉环. 基于公司治理视角的信息披露影响因素分析[J]. 数量经济技术经济研究, 2012, (8): 64-78.
[10]张继勋, 刘成立, 杨明增. 中国审计判断质量的实验研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2006, (6): 45-49.
[11]赵保卿, 朱蝉飞. 注册会计师审计质量控制的博弈分析[J]. 会计研究, 2009, (4): 87-93.
[12]Anastasopoulos N P, Anastasopoulos M P. The evolutionary dynamics of audit[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2012, 216(2): 469-476.
[13]Baron R M, Kenny D A. The moderatormediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, 51(6): 1173-1182.
[14]Bergh D D, Ketchen D J, Boyd B K, et al. New frontiers of the reputation—Performance relationship: Insights from multiple theories[J]. Journal of Management, 2010, 36(3): 620-632.
[15]Castro A C V, Machado A. The interaction of temporal generalization gradients predicts the context effect[J]. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2012, 97(3): 263-279.
[16]DeAngelo L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3(3): 183-199.
[17]Duflo E, Greenstone M, Pande R, et al. What does reputation buy?Differentiation in a market for thirdparty auditors[J]. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 2013, 103(3): 314-319.
[18]Fairchild R. Auditor tenure, managerial fraud and report qualification: A behavioural gametheoretic approach[J]. International Journal of Behavioural Accounting and Finance, 2008, 1(1): 23-37.
[19]Fischbacher U. Ztree: Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments[J]. Experimental Economics, 2007, 10(2): 171-178.
[20]Goldman A, Barlev B. The auditorfirm conflict of interests: Its implications for independence[J].The Accounting Review, 1974, 49(4): 707-718.
[21]Goodwin J, Yeo T Y. Two factors affecting internal audit independence and objectivity:Evidence from Singapore[J]. International Journal of Auditing, 2001, 5(2): 107-125.
[22]Hay D, Knechel W R, Wong N. Audit fees: A metaanalysis of the effect of supply and demand attributes[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2006, 23(1):141-191.
[23]Hayes A F, Preacher K J. Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical independent variable[J]. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 2014, 67(3): 451-470.
[24]Huberman B A, Loch C H, nüler A. Status as a valued resource[J]. Social Psychology Quarterly, 2004, 67(1): 103-114.
[25]Jin J Y, Kanagaretnam K, Lobo G J. Ability of accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial crisis[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2011, 35(11): 2811-2819.
[26]King R R. An experimental investigation of selfserving biases in an auditing trust game: The effect of group affiliation[J]. The Accounting Review, 2002, 77(2): 265-284.
[27]Messier Jr W F, Reynolds J K, Simon C A, et al. The effect of using the internal audit function as a management training ground on the external auditor’s reliance decision[J]. The Accounting Review, 2011, 86(6): 2131-2154.
[28]Morton S. Strategic auditing for fraud[J]. The Accounting Review, 1993, 68(4): 825-839.
[29]Preacher K J, Hayes A F. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models[J]. Behavior Research Methods, 2008, 40(3): 879-891.
[30]Sinha P, Hunt H G. Auditor independence:A nonparametric test of differences across the Big5 public accounting firms[J]. Accounting Perspectives, 2013, 12(4): 301-320.
[31]Tepalagul N, Lin L. Auditor independence and audit quality: A literature review[J]. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 2015, 30(1): 101-121.
[32]Toth A. Reputation effects in the market of certifiers: Evidence from the audit industry[J]. Economic Inquiry, 2014, 52(2): 505-517.
[33]Zimbelman M F, Waller W S. An experimental investigation of auditorauditee interaction under ambiguity[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 1999, 37(1): 135-155.
引用本文
李建标, 殷西乐, 任 雪. 实验市场中的审计博弈与审计质量——审计师声誉和企业内部监督的比较制度实验研究[J]. 财经研究, 2015, 41(10): 0.
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