作为企业经营成本的重要部分,过重的社会保险缴费负担直接降低了中小企业的参保意愿和缴费水平。这使得工业企业缴费水平可能低于政策缴费率,也导致不同企业之间实际缴费率存在差异,而且社会保险缴费可能增加了企业经营活动的负担。解决这些问题不仅有助于理解企业社会保险缴费的内在动机,而且有助于社会保险征收制度的顶层设计,并为供给侧结构性改革的“降成本”提供理论依据和实践参考。文章尝试研究这些问题,基于利润最大化框架,系统考察了劳动力市场规模与企业社会保险缴费比例的逻辑关系。理论分析表明,给定企业社会保险缴费具有改善劳动生产率和增加财务困境风险的双重作用,最优社会保险缴费比例应满足边际收益等于边际成本。伴随着劳动力市场规模扩张,再就业搜寻成本和工资构成中的解雇风险补偿下降,企业社会保险缴费引致的边际成本越小,均衡状态的最优社保缴费比例趋于向上调整。文章以行业就业容量衡量劳动力市场规模的计量结果显示,劳动力市场规模增加会显著提升企业社会保险缴费比例,并集中体现于行业内而非行业间,而且在高融资约束企业、高失业成本企业和民营企业更为凸显。进一步,企业社会保险缴费比例提升会显著降低其经营绩效,即成本效应占据主导地位。文章强调,企业社会保险缴费行为内生于所处的行业环境,在政策调整时需要加以考虑。
劳动力市场规模与企业社会保险缴费比例
摘要
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引用本文
刘媛媛, 封进, 刘贯春. 劳动力市场规模与企业社会保险缴费比例[J]. 财经研究, 2021, 47(8): 64-78.
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