财政转移支付与农业新质生产力发展
Fiscal Transfer Payments and the Development of Agricultural New Quality Productive Forces
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20260611.401
[1]刘展豪,李琳,庞国光,郭东.财政转移支付与农业新质生产力发展[J/OL].财经研究,2026,52(08):124-138[2026-11-11].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20260611.401.
摘要
农业大县财政困境与隐性利益流失削弱了地方政府发展农业的积极性,是制约农业新质生产力发展的关键因素。作为典型的定向激励机制,产粮大县奖励政策通过财政转移支付缓解地方财政压力,其能否促进农业新质生产力发展仍待检验。文章构建群聚—双重差分(Bunching-DID)模型,利用政策入围门槛作为制度断点,识别该政策对策略型产粮大县与典型产粮大县农业新质生产力的影响。研究发现:第一,产粮大县奖励政策有效增强了县级政府农业发展意愿,在政策入围门槛右侧形成显著的群聚现象;第二,产粮大县奖励政策显著促进了策略型产粮大县农业新质生产力的提高,其效应主要通过扩大农业社会化服务供给与优化资源配置实现;第三,奖励政策对策略型产粮大县农业新质生产力的激励效应因财政状况与产业禀赋而异,并且存在政策响应意愿与激励效果的错位问题;第四,典型产粮大县倾向于将奖励资金投入工业与城市部门,这导致政策效应不显著,而农业绩效考核的完善为政策发挥效果提供制度支撑。文章的研究有助于厘清地方政府对涉农财政转移支付的响应意愿与资金配置情况,为中央政府进一步完善农业定向激励机制、激发农业新质生产力的内生动力提供微观证据。
Building a strong nation requires strong agriculture. Developing agricultural new quality productive forces (ANQPFs) is the key to achieving a leap from a major agricultural country to an agricultural powerhouse. The financial difficulties and hidden loss of benefits in agricultural counties have weakened the enthusiasm of local governments to develop agriculture, which is a key factor restricting the development of ANQPFs. As a typical targeted incentive mechanism, the Granary County Subsidy Program, through fiscal transfer payments, still needs to be systematically tested for its capability to alleviate local financial pressure and promote the development of ANQPFs. This paper constructs a Bunching-DID model and uses the policy entry threshold as an institutional breakpoint to identify the impact of the Granary County Subsidy Program on the ANQPFs in strategic grain-producing counties and typical grain-producing counties. The results show that: First, the policy effectively enhances the willingness of county-level governments to develop agriculture, forming a significant bunching phenomenon on the right side of the policy entry threshold. Second, the policy significantly stimulates the development of ANQPFs in strategic grain-producing counties, and this effect is mainly achieved through expanding agricultural socialized services and optimizing resource allocation. Third, the incentive effect of the policy on the ANQPFs in strategic grain-producing counties varies with fiscal conditions and industrial endowments, revealing a mismatch between willingness and effectiveness. This paper helps clarify the willingness and funding allocation orientation of local governments in responding to agricultural fiscal transfer payments, offering micro evidence for the central government to further improve agricultural targeted incentive mechanisms and strengthen the endogenous driving force of ANQPFs.
关键词: 产粮大县奖励政策,财政转移支付,农业新质生产力,群聚—双重差分模型
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