As for the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R & D, there has been a divergence of current research conclusions. With constant deepening of the research, the importance of financing constraints in the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R & D has also gradually been recognized by the academia. In order to define the effect of financing constraints on the relationship between managerial incentives and firm R & D efficiency, based on the data of industrial listed companies from 2009 to 2013 in China, this paper uses stochastic frontier model to analyze the influence of managerial incentives on firm R & D efficiency, and finds that the monetary compensation incentives for the management are beneficial to the improvement of firm R & D efficiency level, and when equity incentives for the management are carried out, firms should give the best stake to the management according to their own actual situations, in order to avoid low firm R & D efficiency resulting from the lack of equity incentives or too large equity incentives. At the same time, taking the reality of financing constraints the firms suffer into account, it finds that financing constraints inhibit the positive role of monetary compensation incentives in firm R & D efficiency to some extent; on the contrary, it can improve the governance effect of equity incentives on firm R & D innovation. This paper not only enriches the related research results about corporate governance and innovation management, but also provides the empirical evidence for the reasonable design of management compensation contracts to improve firm R & D efficiency.