近年来,我国地方债务风险高企,引发了金融生态系统的失衡。文章从股权质押的角度研究了地方政府融资的“挤出效应”,以厘清公司控股股东实施股权质押的外部动因。研究发现,地方政府“城投债”规模越大,挤占当地可借贷资源越严重,当地上市公司控股股东股权质押的比例也越高。由于融资约束是股权质押的重要影响因素,进一步以控股股东的产权性质、行业对资金依赖度、控股股东内部资本市场规模或是否获得现金股利分红来量化融资约束程度,结果发现:民营性质控股股东受地方政府融资挤压越严重,其股权质押比例越高;控股股东内部资本市场规模大或得到现金股利分红均会缓解地方政府融资对股权质押的影响;并且,地方政府资金投向的行业敏感性也对国有或民营企业的股权质押行为产生了差异性影响。文章不仅为地方政府融资行为的外部效应提供了微观证据,还对政府部门综合评估地方债务融资风险、加强地方政府债务治理以及监管部门出台“对症”股权质押风险的策略提供了理论依据和经验证据。
地方政府融资与上市公司股权质押——来自融资平台“城投债”的证据
摘要
参考文献
1 陈宝东, 崔晓雪. 地方政府债务、金融营商环境与实体企业融资约束[J]. 财政科学,2022,(1). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.2096-1391.2022.01.009
12 牛霖琳, 夏红玉, 许秀. 中国地方债务的省级风险度量和网络外溢风险[J]. 经济学(季刊),2021,(3). DOI:10.13821/j.cnki.ceq.2021.03.06
21 余海跃, 康书隆. 地方政府债务扩张、企业融资成本与投资挤出效应[J]. 世界经济,2020,(7). DOI:10.19985/j.cnki.cassjwe.2020.07.004
24 中国人民大学课题组. “十四五”时期中国金融改革发展监管研究[J]. 管理世界,2020,(7). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-5502.2020.07.003
27 Bester H. The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information[J]. European Economic Review,1987,31(4):887–899. DOI:10.1016/0014-2921(87)90005-5
28 Demirci I, Huang J, Sialm C. Government debt and corporate leverage: International evidence[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2019,133(2):337–356. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.03.009
29 Dou Y, Masulis R W, Zein J. Shareholder wealth consequences of insider pledging of company stock as collateral for personal loans[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2019,32(12):4810–4854. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhz034
30 Finnerty J E. Insiders and market efficiency[J]. The Journal of Finance,1976,31(4):1141–1148. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01965.x
31 Friedman B M. Implications of government deficits for interest rates, equity returns and corporate financing[R]. Working Paper No. 1520, 1984.
32 Greenwood R, Hanson S, Stein J C. A gap-filling theory of corporate debt maturity choice[J]. The Journal of Finance,2010,65(3):993–1028. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01559.x
33 Huang Y, Pagano M, Panizza U. Local crowding-out in China[J]. The Journal of Finance,2020,75(6):2855–2898. DOI:10.1111/jofi.12966
34 Huang Z Z, Xue Q M. Re-examination of the effect of ownership structure on financial reporting: Evidence from share pledges in China[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research,2016,9(2):137–152. DOI:10.1016/j.cjar.2015.11.001
35 Jiang G H, Lee C M C, Yue H. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1–20. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.05.002
36 La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. The quality of government[J]. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1999,15(1):222–279. DOI:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222
37 Liang Y S, Shi K, Wang L S, et al. Local government debt and firm leverage: Evidence from China[J]. Asian Economic Policy Review,2017,12(2):210–232. DOI:10.1111/aepr.12176
38 Myers S C. The capital structure puzzle[J]. The Journal of Finance,1984,39(3):574–592. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03646.x
39 Pang C J, Wang Y. Stock pledge, risk of losing control and corporate innovation[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2020,60:101534. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101534
40 Pirinsky C, Wang Q H. Does corporate headquarters location matter for stock returns?[J]. The Journal of Finance,2006,61(4):1991–2015. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00895.x
引用本文
郭思永. 地方政府融资与上市公司股权质押——来自融资平台“城投债”的证据[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2023, 25(2): 18-32.
导出参考文献,格式为:
上一篇:区域协调发展的利益调整与法治进路
下一篇:地方官员当地籍贯与信贷资源倾斜