2247 
3046共同机构投资者同时关联行业内多家上市公司，集成强大的信息资源网络，影响企业投融资结构安排。文章以2007—2022年A股上市公司为研究样本，探讨共同机构投资者与投融资期限错配之间的作用关系。研究发现，共同机构投资者的存在、持股比例、横向联结均有助于改善投融资期限错配。机制检验发现，共同机构投资者能够通过增强供应链上话语权、提高商业信用水平以及降低交易成本等，在公司生产经营过程中产生“开源节流”效应，进而减少投融资期限错配。拓展分析表明，共同机构投资者能够与内外部公司治理机制协同作用，对内部控制有效和媒体关注较高的企业作用更为明显；共同机构投资者还能弥补不完全契约和正式制度的缺陷，尤其是对契约环境较差、行业竞争度较低的弱势群体起到了替代性治理作用。经济后果检验发现，共同机构投资者还能进一步强化供应链系统稳定和推动可持续发展，这对助力我国实体经济高质量发展和畅通国内经济循环具有一定的启示作用。
共同机构投资者改善了投融资期限错配吗？——基于供应链关系治理机制
摘要
参考文献
3 杜勇, 娄靖, 胡红燕. 供应链共同股权网络下企业数字化转型同群效应研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2023, (4). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1006-480X.2023.04.001
13 刘贯春, 程飞阳, 姚守宇, 等. 地方政府债务治理与企业投融资期限错配改善[J]. 管理世界, 2022, (11). DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-5502.2022.11.001
30 Azar J, Schmalz M C, Tecu I. Anticompetitive effects of common ownership[J]. The Journal of Finance,2018,73(4):1513–1565. DOI:10.1111/jofi.12698
31 Bajo E, Croci E, Marinelli N. Institutional investor networks and firm value[J]. Journal of Business Research,2020,112:65–80. DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.02.041
32 Brooks C, Chen Z, Zeng Y Q. Institutional cross-ownership and corporate strategy: The case of mergers and acquisitions[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2018,48:187–216. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.003
33 Cheung Y L, Haw I M, Hu B, et al. Common institutional investors and supplier performance in supply chains[J]. Journal of Operations Management,2020,66(6):670–696. DOI:10.1002/joom.1089
34 Edmans A, Levit D, Reilly D. Governance under common ownership[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2019,32(7):2673–2719. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhy108
35 Fan J P H, Titman S, Twite G. An international comparison of capital structure and debt maturity choices[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2012,47(1):23–56. DOI:10.1017/S0022109011000597
36 Gao L, Han J, Kim J B, et al. Overlaping institutional ownership along the supply chain and earnings management of supplier firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2024,84:102520. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102520
37 He J, Huang J K. Product market competition in a world of cross-ownership: Evidence from institutional blockholdings[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2017,30(8):2674–2718. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhx028
38 He J, Huang J K, Zhao S. Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2019,134(2):400–418. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019
39 Kang J K, Luo J, Na H S. Are institutional investors with multiple blockholdings effective monitors?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2018,128(3):576–602. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.005
40 Koch A, Panayides M, Thomas S. Common ownership and competition in product markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2021,139(1):109–137. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.007
41 Leary M T, Roberts M R. Do peer firms affect corporate financial policy?[J]. The Journal of Finance,2014,69(1):139–178. DOI:10.1111/jofi.12094
42 Park J, Sani J, Shroff N, et al. Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2019,67(2-3):387–415. DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2019.02.001
43 Ramalingegowda S, Utke S, Yu Y. Common institutional ownership and earnings management[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2021,38(1):208–241. DOI:10.1111/1911-3846.12628
44 Wang P, Barrese J. Institutional investors, common control, and risk: An investigation into motives and consequences[J]. Review of Business,2019,39(1):45–59.
引用本文
邹颖, 祁亚, 石福安. 共同机构投资者改善了投融资期限错配吗？——基于供应链关系治理机制[J]. 上海财经大学学报, 2024, 26(2): 18-34.
导出参考文献，格式为：
下一篇：区域协调发展的利益调整与法治进路
