公司诉讼是影响企业正常经营的非常规事件,不仅可能造成财务损失,还可能影响企业声誉,导致客户流失以及后续融资等诸多问题,因此对公司诉讼风险影响因素的研究有重要意义。基于公司治理文献,本文以2007-2014年中国A股上市公司为初始研究样本,运用倾向得分匹配方法(PSM)分析了大股东持股对公司诉讼风险的影响。研究发现:(1)随着第一大股东持股比例的提高,公司诉讼风险显著降低。(2)随着公司可见性程度的提高,大股东降低公司诉讼风险的作用减弱。也就是说,相较于公司可见性高的企业,大股东在公司可见性低的企业中降低公司诉讼风险的作用更强。(3)相对于股权制衡公司,非股权制衡公司的大股东持股比例降低公司诉讼风险的效应更强。本文不仅深化了公司诉讼风险影响因素研究,而且有助于进一步拓展大股东在公司治理以及风险控制中的作用,对于理解大股东在防范公司诉讼风险方面的作用具有重要意义。
大股东持股与公司诉讼风险--基于中国上市公司的实证分析
摘要
参考文献
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引用本文
赵康生, 周萍, 蔺楠. 大股东持股与公司诉讼风险--基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2017, 39(1): 84–95.
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