创业投资双边道德风险研究前沿与思路探讨
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外国经济与管理 2007 年 第 29 卷第 06 期, 页码：34 - 41
摘要
参考文献
摘要
代理、道德风险和契约设计等问题是当今经济研究的热点之一。创业投资的研究视角已由早期的委托代理理论(即把创业企业家当作代理人并激励其努力)转向双边的道德风险和双边努力激励。本文综述了单边道德风险和双边道德风险的研究进展,剖析了委托人和代理人双方产生道德风险的原因及表现形式,深入研究了双方各自的道德风险产生机理和契约安排,最后指出从相机控制的角度研究契约设计是未来的一个方向。
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[2]Chan,Siegel Thakor.Learning,corporate control and performance requirements in venture capital contracts[J].International Eco-nomic Review,1990,31(2):365-381.
[3]Gompers,P.Optimal investment,monitoring,and the staging of venture capital[J].Journal of Finance,1995,50(5):1462-1486.
[4]Cornelli,F,and Yosha,O.Stage financing and the role of convertible securities[J].Review of Economic Studies,2003,70(1):1-32.
[5]Inderst,R,and Munnich,F.Financing a portfolio of projects[J].Journal of Finance,2006,78(1):1-54.
[6]Cestone,G,and White,L.Anticompetitive financial contracting:The design of financial claims[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(5):2109-2142.
[7]Bachmann,R,and Schindele,I.Theft and syndication in venture capital finance[R].SSRN Working Paper,April 10,2006.
[8]Cooper,Ross.Monopoly provision of product quality with uninformed buyers[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1985,3(4):439-449.
[9]Houben,E.Venture capital,double-sided adverse selection,and double-sided moral hazard[R].SSRN Working Paper,December10,2002.
[10]Casamatta,C.Financing and advising:Optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists[J].SSRN Working Paper,July 10,2003.
[11]Repullo,Suarez.Venture capital finance:A security design approach[R].CEPR Discussion Papers,2004.
[12]Lulfesmann,C.Limited liability and option contracts in models with sequential investments[R].SSRN Working Paper,July 5,2001.
[13]Schmidt,K.Convertible securities and venture capital finance[J].Journal of Finance,2003,58(3):1139-1166.
[14]Kaplan,S,and Stromberg,P.Financial contracting theory meets the real world:An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts[R].Working Paper,NBER,2000.
[15]Garmaise,M.Informed investors and the financing of entrepreneurial projects[R].Working Paper,University of Chicago,2004.
[16]Fenn Liang,et al.The role of angel investors in financing high-tech start-ups[R].Working Paper,CEPR,1998.
[17]Grossman,A.The costs and benefits of ownership:A theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].Journal of Political Economics,1986,94:510-543.
[18]Aghion,P,and Bolton,P.An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting[J].Review of Economic Studies,1992,59:473-494.
[19]Dewatripont,L.Renegotiation design with unverifiable information[J].Econometrical,1994,62:257-282.
[20]Kirilenko,A.Valuation and control in venture capital[J].Journal of Finance,2001,56:565-587.(责任编辑:谷化)
引用本文
殷林森, 胡文伟, 李湛. 创业投资双边道德风险研究前沿与思路探讨[J]. 外国经济与管理, 2007, 29(6): 34–41.
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