家族企业债务期限错配研究

Research on Debt Maturity Mismatch in Family Firms

李孜仪,吕长江,邓悦萌

2026 第 52 卷 第 08 期 页码 139-153

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20260521.301

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摘要

我国企业普遍存在债务期限结构错配现象,这加剧了企业流动性风险,容易引发资金链断裂甚至引发债务危机。文章利用2003—2023年中国沪深A股上市民营企业样本,探讨家族企业对于企业债务期限结构错配水平的影响。研究发现,与非家族企业相比,家族企业的债务期限结构错配水平更低,债务风险敞口更小。机制检验显示,家族企业是出于风险厌恶特征而选择了更低的债务期限结构错配水平。基于社会情感财富理论FIBER框架的分析表明,家族控制权越高、身份认同越强、社会纽带越紧密、情感依恋越深的家族企业对债务期限错配的抑制作用越强;家族创始人或接班人担任CEO时,较职业经理人更倾向于规避债务期限错配风险,且代际间表现一致,这表明保护社会情感财富的行为逻辑具有跨代持续性。经济后果检验发现,与非家族企业相比,家族企业的债务期限结构错配导致的实际违约水平更低,债务风险管理能力更强;此外,面对流动性冲击时,家族企业缩小债务风险敞口,且危机后股价恢复的概率显著高于非家族企业。文章将债务期限错配研究的视角拓展到企业主动风险管理层面,这为理解实体企业债务风险积聚的成因提供了新的思路,对防范化解重大风险工作具有启示意义。

Despite decelerating economic growth, China’s macro leverage ratio remains on the rise. Concurrently, the widespread debt maturity mismatch, characterized by “short-term borrowing for long-term investment”, has intensified the buildup of corporate default risks. There have been rich discussions on the determinants of corporate debt maturity mismatch, but most of them adopt a supply-side perspective of debt fi-nancing, emphasizing that firms passively incur maturity mismatch due to limited access to long-term financing. This paper takes family firms, an important organizational form of private enterprises, as the starting point to explore how family control affects firms’ strategies for debt maturity management.

Using a sample of private listed companies in China from 2003 to 2023, this paper finds that compared with non-family firms, family firms exhibit a lower level of debt maturity mismatch. Mechanism testing indicates that this difference primarily stems from family firms’ adjustments to their asset structure. Textual analysis of the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) sections of annual reports, together with evidence from R&D investment and operating outcomes, further shows that family firms are more risk-averse. In addition, the negative effect of family control on debt maturity mismatch is more pronounced when economic policy uncertainty is higher. Analysis based on the FIBER framework of socioemotional wealth theory reveals that the inhibitory effect is stronger among firms with higher family ownership, stronger family identification, closer binding social ties, deeper emotional attachment, and founder- or successor-CEOs. Economic consequence analysis shows that, for a given level of debt maturity mismatch, family firms are associated with a lower probability of default; in the face of liquidity shocks, they exhibit greater organizational resilience, as reflected in a significantly higher likelihood of post-crisis stock price recovery compared to non-family firms.

This paper makes the following contributions: First, it extends the explanatory framework for debt matu-rity mismatch by shifting the focus from the supply side of debt financing to asset-side decision-making, thereby offering a new perspective on the buildup of debt risks in real-economy firms. Second, it finds that family firms exercise greater prudence in debt maturity management, and systematically reveals the unique value of family firms in risk management from a full life-cycle perspective, advancing the theoretical understanding of family firms’ debt behavior and enriching the literature on the competitive advantages of family firms. Third, it highlights the importance of asset-side resource allocation in debt risk management and provides practical implications for firms to optimize debt structures.

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