债务置换能促进地方融资平台改革转型吗?
Will Debt Swaps Promote the Reform and Transformation of Local Government Financing Vehicles?
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.05.007
[1]李一花,谢梦芮,李林巍,王一迪.债务置换能促进地方融资平台改革转型吗?[J/OL].上海财经大学学报,2026,28(05):95-109[2026-11-11].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.05.007.
摘要
构建与高质量发展相适应的政府债务管理机制,推进地方融资平台改革转型是落实“十五五”财政可持续的重要任务。文章在构建融资平台市场化转型指标体系并采用熵权-TOPSIS法测度的基础上,基于依申请公开收集整理的241个城市债务置换数据,实证检验了首轮债务置换对融资平台市场化转型的影响效应与作用机制。研究发现,债务置换显著促进了融资平台市场化转型。机制检验显示,债务置换同时产生减负效应与道德风险效应,前者通过降低付息负担、实现政企信用切割、缓释隐性债务风险支撑市场化转型,后者通过激励地方投资扩张形成负向制约。综合来看,减负效应整体占优。异质性分析显示,债务置换对融资平台市场化转型的促进作用在期限错配严重、非标依赖度高、信用评级低以及PPP融资依赖度低的样本中更为显著,印证了两条机制此消彼长的边界条件。研究结果为统筹化债与转型提供了新的经验证据和政策参考。
From 2015 to 2018, China issued RMB 12.2 trillion in swap bonds, converting the outstanding debt of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) into low-cost and long-maturity government bonds. Does this policy accelerate the market-oriented transformation of LGFVs, or does it hinder the reform by reinforcing bailout expectations?
This paper constructs a market-oriented transformation index across four dimensions (profitability, asset quality, debt risk, and government linkage) and measures the degree of marketization using the entropy-weighted TOPSIS method. The results show that debt swaps significantly promote the market-oriented transformation of LGFVs. Debt swaps entail two countervailing forces: a burden-reduction effect and a moral hazard effect. The burden-reduction effect lowers interest costs, improves the debt maturity structure, and eases liquidity constraints; these improvements, in turn, promote market-oriented transformation through the separation of government and enterprise credit and the mitigation of implicit debt risks. The moral hazard effect, by contrast, operates by fueling municipal construction investment, which in turn partially offsets the pro-transformation impact; strengthening audit oversight helps contain this channel. Comparing the two effects, the burden-reduction effect dominates the net outcome owing to its immediacy and directness, while the moral hazard effect has a limited adverse impact due to its lagged and indirect nature and the strengthening of central supervision. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the swap effect is more pronounced among LGFVs with severer maturity mismatch, higher non-standard financing dependence, and lower credit ratings, as well as in cities with lower PPP financing dependence. These patterns delineate the boundary conditions under which the two mechanisms wax and wane.
The main implication of this paper is that whether the debt swap policy can accelerate LGFV reform and transformation hinges on constraining moral hazards while delivering burden-reduction gains. Looking ahead, the key to optimizing the debt swap policy lies in hardening budget constraints, so that debt swaps serve as a genuine catalyst for market-oriented LGFV operations rather than a trigger for renewed rounds of implicit debt expansion.
关键词: 债务置换,地方政府融资平台,市场化转型,减负效应,道德风险