公平竞争审查制度与国有企业创新架构

The Fair Competition Review System and the Innovation Structures of State-owned Enterprises

练雨庆

2026 第 28 卷第 03 期页码 14-27

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.03.002

摘要

公平竞争审查制度是破除行政垄断的重要举措，其通过重塑市场竞争和治理环境深刻影响了企业创新活动的组织方式。文章以2012—2022年中国国有上市公司为研究对象，从创新决策权配置的视角考察公平竞争审查制度对企业创新架构的影响。研究发现，公平竞争审查制度能够显著促进国有企业采用分散式创新架构，并且当企业融资约束低、异地子公司数量多、研发背景高管占比低以及高管业绩压力大时，这种创新架构分散化趋势尤为显著。机制检验表明，公平竞争审查制度通过增强市场竞争强度、改善公司内外部治理环境影响企业创新架构选择。经济后果检验表明，公平竞争审查制度推动的分散式创新架构有助于提升企业创新质量。文章探究了影响企业创新架构的前因，为国有企业在制度变革背景下优化创新组织模式、提升创新质量提供了实践参考。

Innovation structure, which refers to how innovation decision-making authority is allocated between the parent and subsidiary companies, has a profound impact on corporate innovation performance. However, as a major participant in technological innovation, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) often overlook the significance of innovation structure optimization. The implementation of the Fair Competition Review System provides an ideal research setting to examine how changes in the external institutional environment drive the transformation of SOE innovation structures. From a theoretical perspective, this policy may affect SOE innovation structures in three ways: First, it strengthens market competition faced by SOEs and increases information costs under centralized innovation structures. Second, it enhances external supervision and promotes improvements in internal governance, reducing agency costs. Third, it reduces government subsidies and decreases the resources available for R&D.

On this basis, this paper takes SOEs from 2012 to 2022 as the research sample and examines the impact of the Fair Competition Review System on SOE innovation structures. The results show that the policy significantly promotes the adoption of decentralized innovation structures in SOEs. This effect is stronger when firms face lower financing constraints, have more geographically dispersed subsidiaries, have a lower proportion of executives with R&D backgrounds, and when executives face higher performance pressure. Mechanism testing shows that the policy affects innovation structures through two channels: increasing market competition intensity and improving the internal and external governance environments of SOEs. In addition, the decentralized innovation structures promoted by the policy help improve SOEs’ innovation quality.

The possible contributions of this paper are as follows: In terms of the research perspective, starting from the Fair Competition Review System, it explores the antecedents that affect SOE innovation structures; in terms of the research content, it examines whether the Fair Competition Review System can fundamentally reshape SOE innovation structures, expanding the research boundary of its impact on corporate innovation behavior; in terms of the research conclusion, it provides SOE managers with feasible guidance for optimizing innovation structures in a constantly changing external environment.

关键词： 公平竞争审查,创新架构,国有企业,创新质量

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