论政府补贴公平竞争审查的集体豁免
On the Block Exemption for Government Subsidies in Fair Competition Review
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.05.009
[1]李希梁.论政府补贴公平竞争审查的集体豁免[J/OL].上海财经大学学报,2026,28(05):125-138[2026-11-11].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2026.05.009.
摘要
我国公平竞争审查制度当前实行全覆盖机制,旨在从源头防范一切可能具有排除、限制竞争效果的政策措施。然而,以政府补贴政策为例,实践中真正构成实质性竞争损害的案例占比极低。这类政策多以应对市场失灵、实现社会或政治目标为导向,其政策效益往往远超潜在竞争损害。在此背景下,全覆盖审查面临行政资源稀缺与错误成本高昂的双重掣肘,其在降低假阴性错误成本方面的边际效益亦有限。因此,有必要构建科学合理的集体豁免机制,通过类型化识别竞争损害风险低且具有显著经济社会效益的补贴政策,并制定明确的豁免标准与定量阈值,将符合条件的补贴政策排除在公平竞争审查范围之外。豁免范围具体涵盖微量补贴、区域投资补贴、中小企业补贴、研发创新补贴、环境保护补贴五类。同时,为避免豁免制度在实践中被滥用,应建立配套监督机制,以确保豁免规则的有效实施与公平竞争审查目标的实现。
China’s fair competition review system currently adopts a full-coverage mechanism, designed to prevent, at the source, all policy measures that may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. However, taking government subsidy policies as an example, practice shows that the proportion of cases that actually cause substantial harm to competition is extremely low. Such policies are mostly oriented towards addressing market failures and achieving social or political objectives, and their policy benefits often far outweigh their potential impact on competition. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to further explore whether China’s fair competition review system should subject all government subsidies to full-coverage review. From the perspective of institutional objectives, the core aim of fair competition review should be to ensure that the goals pursued by government actions can be achieved, and that the overall benefits brought about outweigh the resulting harm to competition. It is not meant to eliminate all competition distortions, and therefore it is unnecessary to cover every subsidy measure. From the perspective of institutional costs, the full-coverage review faces the dual constraints of scarce administrative resources and high error costs, and its marginal benefit in reducing false negative error costs is also very limited. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a scientific and reasonable block exemption mechanism, to identify by category those subsidy policies with low risk of harming competition and significant economic and social benefits, and to formulate clear exemption standards and quantitative thresholds to exclude qualifying subsidy policies from fair competition review. The construction of block exemption generally follows the principle of combining leniency with strictness. It must avoid falling into the Nirvana fallacy that “all review errors can be eliminated”, while also preventing overly lax exemption standards from rendering the fair competition review system ineffective. The scope of exemption specifically covers five categories: de minimis subsidies, regional investment subsidies, subsidies for small and medium-sized enterprises, R&D and innovation subsidies, and environmental protection subsidies. At the same time, to prevent abuse of the exemption system in practice, a supporting oversight mechanism should be established to ensure the effective implementation of the exemption rules and the realization of the objectives of fair competition review.
关键词: 公平竞争审查,全覆盖审查,政府补贴,集体豁免