This paper analyzes the cost of the corporate governance of multiple major shareholders from the perspective of executive overcompensation. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016, this paper conducts an empirical study on the relationship between the governance of multiple major shareholders and the excess remuneration of CEOs. Firstly, in our country, the ownership structure of listed companies is more centralized, which provides more abundant observation samples for the study of the potential negative impact of the governance of multiple major shareholders. The research finds that the excess CEO compensation of listed companies is positively correlated with the checks and balances of major shareholders and many major shareholders. Secondly, our government continues to promote the reform of mixed ownership and encourage the coexistence of various economic components of ownership. It is a common phenomenon for listed companies to have both state-owned shares and private shares. This paper finds that when there are many large shareholders of different nature, CEOs’ salary level is higher, and when the two different kinds of shareholding power are equal, CEOs’ salary is higher. Thirdly, existing studies have found that the existence of large shareholders may lead to the failure of the supervision mechanism, which has a serious impact on the company’s business decision-making. This paper finds that earnings management behavior and the existence of large shareholders lead to more compensation for CEOs and the increase of the agency cost of executives.

The contributions of this paper lie in three aspects: Firstly, this paper provides a more comprehensive understanding of the role of multiple major shareholders in corporate governance. Secondly, this paper will help to provide reference for the analysis of potential advantages and disadvantages of mixed ownership reform and diversification of corporate governance. Thirdly, from the perspective of the relationship between major shareholders and interest collusion, this paper provides a relevant basis for the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism of multiple major shareholders.