As Chinese family firms accelerate their internationalization, the logic behind their entry-mode decisions has become an important research focus. However, existing research tends to treat family firms as a homogeneous group, overlooking that family involvement generates distinct strategic preferences. Drawing on the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory, this paper distinguishes between management-controlled and ownership-controlled family firms, examining how family involvement affects their entry modes. It further investigates how parent-firm performance shortfalls and ownership checks moderate the SEW weight asymmetry between parent and subsidiary firms. Using a sample of China’s main-board listed family firms and their foreign subsidiaries from 2013 to 2021, the study finds that management-controlled family firms (high family involvement), driven by stronger SEW preservation motives, are more inclined to choose wholly-owned entry modes, whereas ownership-controlled firms (low family involvement) exhibit a weaker preference for full ownership. Performance shortfalls heighten parent firms’ sensitivity to SEW losses, thereby weakening the wholly-owned preference of firms with high family involvement. Ownership checks constrain the family’s control and emotional attachment to foreign subsidiaries, further reducing their inclination toward full ownership, although this effect is not statistically significant. This paper not only challenges the homogeneity assumption prevalent in family-firm internationalization research but also highlights the crucial role of parent-subsidiary SEW heterogeneity in shaping entry-mode decisions, extending the explanatory boundaries of the SEW theory within the field of international business.