The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) usually adjusts the relevant institutional arrangements directly by administrative orders, and has achieved positive results in the property right structure, the diversification of governance structure, etc., but it still faces problems such as the increase of reform resistance.

Implementing industrial policy is a government-led behavior to improve industrial growth and adjust industrial structure. The successful experience of Japan in 1980s has played an exemplary role in the industrial policy led by the government of China. However, whether the government-led industrial policy model should be implemented and the effect after implementation have been widely debated. Theoretically, industrial policy will change the relationship of industrial competition, guide the flow of factor resources in the industry, and also bring short-term excess earnings to enterprises. In the process of mixed-ownership reform, when the government has a certain degree of decentralization, the willingness of non-state-owned shareholders to enter the reform of SOEs becomes a key factor, and rational non-state-owned shareholders are more willing to participate in the profitable reform of SOEs.

This paper studies whether the reform of mixed ownership is affected by the national industrial policy. By collecting the industrial policy of encouraging industry development in the national “11th Five Year Plan”, “12th Five Year Plan” and “13th Five Year Plan”, taking the nature, shareholding ratio and relationship of the top ten shareholders of state-owned listed companies in 2008-2017 as samples, this paper investigates the impact of industrial policy on the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs. It is found that industrial policy has a significant inhibitory effect on the mixed-ownership reform of SOEs. Furthermore, from the perspective of market-oriented degree and SOE classification reform, the heterogeneity effect of industrial policy on the reform of mixed ownership is examined. The results show that the inhibition effect is more obvious in the regions with higher degree of marketization and commercial competitive industries. The mechanism test shows that industrial policy has a negative impact on the reform of mixed ownership by increasing the entry barriers of encouraged industries.

The main contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, it innovatively examines the influencing mechanism of industrial policy on the reform of mixed ownership, and enriches the literature on the economic consequence and influencing factors of mixed-ownership reform. Secondly, the results are of great practical significance. In the regions with a higher degree of marketization and commercial competitive industries, the inhibition of industrial policy incentives on the reform of mixed ownership is more obvious. This provides an empirical basis for building a new relationship between the government and the market, giving full play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of resources, and provides enlightenment for the current problems of increasing resistance to the reform of mixed ownership and “difficult access” of non-state capital.