高敬忠, 周晓苏. Can Managerial Stock Holdings Reduce Agency Conflicts in Voluntary Information Disclosure? Taking the Earnings Forecast Data of A?share Listed Companies for Example in China[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2013, 39(11): 124–134.
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Journal of Finance and Economics
LiuYuanchun, Editor-in-Chief
ZhengChunrong, Vice Executive Editor-in-Chief
YaoLan BaoXiaohua HuangJun, Vice Editor-in-Chief
Can Managerial Stock Holdings Reduce Agency Conflicts in Voluntary Information Disclosure? Taking the Earnings Forecast Data of A?share Listed Companies for Example in China
Journal of Finance and Economics Vol. 39, Issue 11, pp. 124 - 134 (2013)
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