1.School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China 2.Institute of Financial Accounting and Auditing, Xiamen National Accounting Institute, Xiamen 361007, China
Following decades of high-speed growth, the Chinese economy has entered a “new normal” characterized by a deceleration of growth. Concurrently, the government has implemented large-scale “tax and fee reduction” policies to stimulate the real economy. While these policies are effective in reducing the burden on market entities, they have created substantial tax revenue growth pressure. Does this pressure incentivize tax authorities to enhance regulatory precision, optimize services, and promote corporate tax compliance? This paper addresses this gap by providing a micro-level empirical analysis of how tax authorities respond to tax revenue growth pressure and the subsequent impact on corporate tax compliance behavior.
This paper finds that tax revenue growth pressure significantly increases the amount of corporate tax repayments, primarily driven by penalty-based tax repayments. In the high growth pressure group, the governance effect is more pronounced for both penalty-based and self-inspection tax repayments. The compliance effect is stronger in regions with a higher level of tax administrative penalties and greater collection effectiveness, confirming the role of deterrence. Tax pressure also acts as a forcing mechanism for local tax bureaus to improve service quality in weaker areas. Furthermore, digitalization empowers tax authorities to shift from an ex-post punishment governance mode to an ex-ante prevention governance mode.
This paper proposes a three-pronged policy strategy, including enforcing precision differentiated regulation, building a preventive service system, and setting scientific budgeting and performance evaluation goals. The significance of this paper lies in its ability to disentangle the complex behavioral responses of tax authorities under tax revenue growth pressure. It moves beyond the simple “deterrence vs. service” dichotomy, and investigates whether fiscal pressure acts as a catalyst for modernizing tax administration. Understanding this dynamic is crucial for designing tax systems that balance revenue adequacy with taxpayer rights and compliance costs.
Tax growth pressure on A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023
828.0 (KB)
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Heterogeneity analysis of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (report profits, technical characteristics, industry categories, market environment, company size)
906.0 (KB)
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Tax compliance governance of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023
759.2 (KB)
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Control variables for A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (per capita GDP, fiscal decentralization, net asset profit margin, asset liability ratio, shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, and operating revenue scale)
528.6 (KB)
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Optimizing tax service mechanisms for A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (Business Environment Index)
310.3 (KB)
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Tax collection and management efforts mechanism of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (degree of tax collection and management efforts)
435.7 (KB)
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Enforcement deterrence mechanism of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (number of tax administrative penalties)
289.5 (KB)
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Stability indicators of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (target growth rate of tax revenue budget in the location of subsidiaries, type of audit opinion)
368.3 (KB)
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Adjustment effect of A-share listed companies from 2018 to 2023 (level of digital economy development)
221.1 (KB)
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Competitive Hypothesis of A-share Listed Companies from 2018 to 2023 (Tax Competition Pressure, Regional Distribution, Digital Tickets)
608.2 (KB)
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Data and Program Code
136.7 (KB)
Cite this article
Chen Sixia, Liu Kailai, Chen Aihua. Tax Revenue Growth Pressure and Corporate Tax Compliance Governance: A Perspective Based on Corporate Tax Repayments[J]. Journal of Finance and Economics, 2026, 52(6): 139-153.