Business Tax to Value-added Tax Reform（BTtoVAT）is the continuation and the fundamental measure of the structural tax cuts policy. On January 1, 2012, the pilot reform of BTtoVAT was initiated in Shanghai. Since then, BTtoVAT has gradually achieved the expansion from breadth and depth. It was fully implemented in China on May 1, 2016. With the expansion of BTtoVAT, the effect of tax reduction is gradually obvious. Tax reduction is not only reflected in the decline of taxpayers’ tax burden, but also reflected in the reduction of government tax revenue and fiscal revenue. Studies show that in the short term, BTtoVAT significantly increases the financial pressure on local governments.　　This paper will test whether the fiscal pressure brought by BTtoVAT further increases local governments’ dependence on land finance. At the same time, the announcement of national land supervision issued on March 21, 2014 revealed that the scale of construction land in some provinces in 2013 had exceeded the planning target of 2020. Then, as the construction land breaks through the planning target of 2020, the pressure on local governments to be restricted by the binding target of construction land gradually increases. Will their behaviors of transferring construction land to obtain land finance revenue be constrained? Therefore, this paper mainly studies the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue, and analyzes whether this impact is constrained by the binding target of construction land.　　Based on the existing literature and data, this paper constructs an analysis framework. Furthermore, it uses econometric models to examine the impact of B2V on land finance revenue and considers the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land based on the China Land Market Website’s land transfer dataset in 82 cities and 422 counties from 2009 to 2015. The major findings are as follows: First, B2V has a positive impact on local governments’ land finance revenue, and the impact of B2V on land finance revenue is constrained by the binding target of construction land. Second, the constraining effect of the binding target of construction land has begun to be highlighted since 2014. Third, prefecture-level governments are more sensitive to the binding target of construction land than county-level governments.　　The main contributions are reflected in the following three points: First, the impact of BTtoVAT on land finance revenue is analyzed. Second, in the process of analyzing land finance revenue, the constraint effect of the binding target of construction land is considered. Third, we distinguish prefecture-level and county-level local governments in the process of empirically analyzing land finance revenue. This study has important theoretical and practical significance for deepening the new round of fiscal and tax system reform represented by BTtoVAT, controlling the differentiated land finance revenue at prefecture and county levels, and even improving the binding target of construction land at prefecture and county levels.