High stock dividend plans are widely adopted by listed firms in China and are often met with favorable market reactions. When undertaken to cater to investors’ irrational preferences, high stock dividend plans may not only mislead investors but also adversely affect firms’ long-term performance.

Focusing on the disciplining role of regulation, this paper employs a DID design to examine how the par-value delisting rule affects corporate stock dividend decisions. It thereby provides evidence on both the effectiveness of the par-value delisting policy and its governance effect on the “high stock dividend” phenomenon. The results show that firms with higher pre-policy stock dividend ratios become significantly less likely to undertake high stock dividend plans following the introduction of the par-value delisting rule. The study further investigates the mechanisms through which the rule affects corporate stock dividend decisions. First, high stock dividends result in substantial downward ex-rights adjustments in share prices, thereby increasing exposure to par-value delisting risks and directly inducing listed firms to modify their stock dividend strategies. Second, when high stock dividend plans result in low share prices, firms with greater risks may experience more pronounced stock price volatility and are therefore more likely to breach the par-value delisting threshold. These firms consequently have stronger incentives to reduce high stock dividend practices. Finally, the par-value delisting rule weakens investors’ favorable expectations regarding high stock dividends and significantly reduces the positive abnormal returns associated with their announcements, which diminishes firms’ incentives to implement such plans.

This paper makes the following contributions: First, it extends the literature on the determinants of high stock dividend practices from the perspective of delisting system reform. Second, whereas prior studies have primarily focused on how financial delisting criteria affect corporate behavior, this paper investigates the par-value delisting rule and thus offers a new perspective on the economic consequences of delisting regulation. Third, it provides useful implications for securities regulators, listed firms, and investors seeking a deeper understanding of the governance effects of the par-value delisting rule.